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Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission. Religious Freedom and AntiDiscrimination Laws Square Off in the
Landlord/Tenant Setting
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly believed that this nation was "founded upon the
conviction that the right to observe one's faith, free from government1
interference, is among the most treasured birthrights of every American."
At the same time, because "the act of discrimination itself demeans basic
human dignity" states are enacting laws to prevent discrimination in the
housing market. 2 How then, does one go about correcting a problem which
requires infringing upon either the right to freely exercise one's religious
beliefs or permits legalized discrimination? That is the question which faced
the Supreme Court of California in a recent decision which pitted a landlord
against an unmarried heterosexual couple who were refused a lease because
their living together was against the landlord's religious beliefs.
The United States Supreme Court has gone through several approaches
in analyzing people's rights to freely exercise their religion. At its most
basic level of analysis, the Court distinguished between religious belief and
conduct. 3 The Court held that while religious belief is absolutely protected,
conduct is not.4 Next, the Court adopted a balancing test wherein the
Court balanced the interest of the state against that of an individual whose
First Amendment right was to be infringed.5 This test, which eventually
came to be known as the "compelling interest" test, required the state to
prove it had a compelling interest, in order to invade an individual's
religious liberty. 6 In 1990, the Supreme Court completely abandoned its
"compelling interest" test which upset many members of Congress to the

1. Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 940 (Cal. 1996)
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 939-40 (quoting Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment and Housing
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 704 (1991) (Kennard, J.dissenting)).
3. Id. at 919.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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point that they passed a law, known as the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, which required the courts to reinstill the very test just dismissed by the
Supreme Court. 7 Recently, the Supreme Court of California appears to
have departed from the compelling interest test, and this note will examine
why it did so and whether that departure was a positive one.
This note examines the decision of Smith v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission.8 Part I provides a historical overview of the various
approaches the United States Supreme Court has taken in analyzing the right
to freely exercise religion. Part R presents the facts of the case, procedural
history, and analyzes the California Supreme Court's holding and reasoning
as well as the various concurring and dissenting opinions. Part II also puts
forth a suggested approach to deal with future cases involving the free
exercise clause by using previous case law and approaches adopted by the
Supreme Court before its decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 9 Part 1I discusses the future
implications of the Smith decision, its impact on society, and the law in
general. Part IV concludes that the test used by the California Supreme
Court was not a valid analysis and that courts should return to the analysis
originally established by the United States Supreme Court.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first alteration to the United States Constitution that the framers
chose to make, as part of the Bill of Rights, was one concerning the
religious liberty of Americans. 10
"The First Amendment provides,
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . 11 Similarly, every one of the
fifty state constitutions in the United States guarantees its citizens the
freedom to exercise religion. 12 Therefore, it appears religious freedom is
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
8. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10. George L. Opie, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion-State Court Devalues
Landlords' ConstitutionalRights, 20 S.ILL. U. L.J. 181, 182 (1995) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. I.).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 183 (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; ARIz.
CONST. art. XX, 1; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art.
II, § 4; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 3; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, 3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 3; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7; KY.
CONST. § 5; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights, art
XXXVI; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XVIII, § 1, amended by MASS. CONST. art. XXXXVI,
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3
both a highly valued and enduring right in the United States)
In one of the earliest free exercise cases to come before the Supreme
Court, there was a quick differentiation made between religious belief and
religious conduct. 14 Although freedom of religious belief is absolutely
protected, conduct is not.15 As early as 1878, the United States Supreme
Court held that generally applicable laws which incidentally burden a
person's right to freely exercise his or her religion were not sufficient an
infringement to be considered a valid objection to the law. In Reynolds v.
United States, people whose religious beliefs required polygamous marriages
First Amendment from a polygamy statute
were not shielded by the
16
behavior.
such
outlawing
The Court continued with this rather simple distinction between belief
and conduct to resolve cases where religious freedom and generally
applicable laws were in conflict until 1963, when it decided Sherbert v.
Verner.17 Ms. Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church who was discharged by her employer because she would not work
on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. 18 She was denied unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act, which provided that a claimant was ineligible for
benefits if she had failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable
work when offered.19 The Court held that the state must demonstrate a
compelling interest to justify its actions which infringe upon an individual's
free exercise of religion and that it is not enough for the state to merely
show its actions are rationally related to accomplishing a government
purpose. Justice Brennan stated that merely showing "a rational relation-

§ 1; MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. II; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; Miss.

CONST. art. III, § 18; MO. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 5; NEB. CONST. art.
I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I,§ 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. V; N.J. CONST. art. I, 3; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 3; PA. CONST.
art. I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. XXVI, § 18; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; UTAH CONST.
art. 1, § 4; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11;
W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18).
13. George L. Opie, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion-State Court Devalues
Landlords' ConstitutionalRights,20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 181, 183 (1995).
14. Smith, 913 P.2d at 919.
15. Id.
16. 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. Id. at 399.
19. Id. at 401.
20. Id. at 406.
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ship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, 'only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation ....
Thereafter, the Court adopted a balancing test wherein it weighed the
burden of religious exercise against the government's interest in enacting
and applying the law.2 2 The threshold question was whether the burden
on the individual's religious exercise was substantial.23 Once the burden
was found to be substantial, it was then weighed against the government's
interest. If the individual's substantial interest outweighed the government's
interest, "the government was required to accommodate the religiously
motivated conduct by exempting it from the law." 24 However, if the
government's interest was of "sufficient importance to outweigh the burden
on religious exercise and could not be achieved by less restrictive means, no
accommodation was required." 25 This balancing test came to be called the
"compelling interest" test, following the language used in Sherbert v.
6
2

Verner.

The Supreme Court went on to describe the level of state interest
necessary to override the protection provided by the free exercise clause in
Wisconsin v. Yoder.2 7 In it, the Yoder family, members of the Old Order
Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were
convicted of violating Wisconsin's Compulsory School-Attendance Law by
declining to send their children to public or private school following their
graduation from the eighth grade. 28 The parents sincerely believed that
high school attendance would go against the Amish religion and way of life
and that they would endanger their own salvation as well as their childrens'
by complying with the law. 29 The State of Wisconsin claimed to have a
compelling interest behind compulsory education, and the Court conceded
that "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education." 30 However, after balancing the
interests, the Court concluded that only a state interest of the "highest
21. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
22. Smith, 913 P.2d at 919.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 919-20.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).

28. Id. at 207-08. The law required children to attend school until reaching the age of

16. Id. n.2 (1972).

29. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208.
30. Id. at 213; See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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order," which this was not, would prevail over the free exercise of
freedom was protected
religion. 31 Therefore, the Yoder family's religious
32
and they were exempted from the state statute.
In 1990, the Supreme Court made a sharp deviation from its own

compelling interest test when it "abandoned balancing as a way of
adjudicating religiously motivated challenges to generally applicable

laws." 33

The Court left the balancing test, along with many of the

protections it had constructed around the free exercise clause when it
decided Employment Div., Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.34 Alfred Smith and Galen Black had ingested peyote, a controlled
substance, as part of a Native American Church religious ritual. 35 Because
of their use of the drug, they were both fired from their jobs at a private
drug rehabilitation clinic, wherein they attempted to collect unemployment
benefits. 36 They were found to be ineligible for such benefits because
they had been fired for work-related misconduct. 37 The Oregon Supreme
Court concluded that the state's law violated Smith and Black's free exercise
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. 38 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that
have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . . 3 The Court
determined the law to be neutral and of general application because it did
not intentionally target any particular religious group. 40 Smith and Black
were thus not able to receive benefits because their free exercise rights did
not exempt them from the state's law.4 1 The majority claimed the Court
had never "held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse[d] him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law . ... ,42 Rather, the Court
distinguished the earlier case in which it had granted individual exemptions
for religiously motivated conduct as having involved "not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other

31. Id. at 215.
32. Id. at 236.

33. Smith, 913 P.2d at 920.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 875.

39. Id. at 886.
40. Id. at 876.

41. Id. at 878-79.
42. Id. at 884-85.
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constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press . . . 43 The ramifications of this
decision spread quickly as the new
44
rule was applied by the lower courts.
Smith generated substantial criticism from several Supreme Court
Justices, 4 5 as well as many legal commentators. 46 In 1993, in response
43. Id. at 881. These situations involving, the free exercise clause, plus another
constitutional right have come to be known as "hybrid right[s]." Id. at 881-82. Note that
Mrs. Smith in Smith v. FairEmployment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal.
1996), (the subject of this Casenote, yet to be discussed) did postulate the presence of "hybrid
rights" in her case. Her claim was based on the fact that the state interfered with the
management of her property, which is protected by the just compensation clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its
interference with her free exercise rights. Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n,
913 P.2d 909, 921 n.15 (Cal. 1996). For further discussion on this possibility, See, Peter
M. Stein, Note, Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: Does the Right to
Exclude, Combined with Religious Freedom, Present a "Hybrid Situation" Under
Employment Div. v. Smith?, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 141 (1995).
44. See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991) (church lost free exercise challenge to the City
Landmark Commission's designation of the church building as historic landmark thus
restricting the church's ability to renovate); Salvation Army v. Dep't of Community Affairs,
919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990) (Salvation Army subjected to a myriad of regulations in order
to provide housing to homeless); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464
(8th Cir. 1991) (church lost challenge to zoning ordinance preventing location in desired
area); You Vang Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990), withdrawn, 750 F. Supp.
558 (D.R.I. 1990) ) (Hmong family lost an objection to routine autopsy of son who died of
a seizure); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, Mich., 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990),
aff'd, 940 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1991). See also, Peter M. Stein, Note, Smith v. Fair
Employment and Housing Commission: Does the Right to Exclude, Combined with Religious
Freedom, Present a "Hybrid Situation" Under Employment Division v. Smith?, 4 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 141, 157 n.99 (1995).
45. Justice O'Connor, who concurred with the majority in the outcome, felt its
reasoning was flawed and expressed her concern that "today's holding dramatically departs
from [the] well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence ... and is incompatible with our
Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty." EmploymentDiv., Dep't
of Human Resources of Or., 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined dissenting, felt that "the majority is able
to arrive at this view only by mischaracterizing this Court's precedents ... [and] in short,
it effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our
Constitution." EmploymentDiv., 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Several years
later, even Justice Souter, concurring in Churchof the Lukumi BabaluAye v. City ofHialeah,
said "I have doubts about whether the Smith rule merits adherence." 508 U.S. 520, 559
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundationsof Religious
Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455 (1991); Lawrence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, Level of
Generalityinthe Definition ofRights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Richard K. Sherwin,
RhetoricalPluralismand the DiscourseIdeal: CounteringDivision of Employment v. Smith,
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to the Smith case, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(hereinafter RFRA). 47 RFRA was designed to "re-establish the signifi-

cance of an individual's religious rights by restoring 'the compelling interest

test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . ..and Wisconsin v. Yoder . ..and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened." ''4 8 The Act provides that a person whose religious beliefs or conduct would be substantially burdened by complying with
a government law is excused from complying with that law, unless the
government can demonstrate the law advances a compelling governmental
that interest. 4 9
interest and that it is the least restrictive means of furthering
to
In summation, the law requires the courts to apply a strict scrutiny test 50
religion.
of
exercise
free
person's
a
burdens
substantially
which
law
any
However, Congress did not set out the parameters of what constitutes
a substantial burden. As will be seen later in this Casenote, this is a pivotal
A Parableof Pagans, Politics,and MajoritarianRule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 388 (1991);
Michael W. McConnell, FreeExercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 388 (1991).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
48. George L. Opie, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion-State Court Devalues
Landlords' ConstitutionalRights,20 S.ILL. U. L.J. 181, 185 (1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb (Supp. V. 1993)). It is also interesting to note that the scope of support for the
RFRA was remarkable. Supporters included a broad coalition of religious groups as well as
a range of other groups including the American Bar Association, American Civil Liberties
Union, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the Christian Legal Society,
and the Home School Legal Defense Association. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas,
Interpretingthe Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 210 & fn. 9
(1994). The RFRA passed without opposition in the House of Representatives, and only
three senators voted against it. 139 Cong. Rec. H2356-03,2363 (daily ed. May 11, 1993);
139 Cong. Rec. H8713-04,8715 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993); 139 Cong. Rec. S14461-01,14471
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
50. George L. Opie, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion-State Court Devalues
Landlords' ConstitutionalRights,20 S.ILL. U. L.J. 181, 185 n.40 (1995). The applicable
portion of the code states:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-I (Supp. V. 1993).
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issue because it is the threshold question to activate the protections provided
by the RFRA.
We now turn to the more specific area of free exercise conflicts this
Casenote will examine, those involved when a landlord chooses not to rent
to particular tenants for religious reasons.
Conflicts between landlords and tenants have likely existed since the
first such relationship was established, however "until recently few cases
have involved landlords who refuse to rent to unmarried couples because of
religious and moral objections." 51 The first such case to arise was Mister
v.A.R.K Partnership.52 In Mister, the Illinois Appellate Court determined
that a landlord could refuse to rent to an unmarried couple because the
couple was not a member of a protected class.5 3 The couple claimed to
fall under the "marital status" classification of the Illinois' Human Rights
Act, 54 but the court held that Illinois' prohibition against sex-based or
marital-based discrimination did not include a landlord's denial to rent to an
unmarried couple. 55 After examining the legislative intent behind the Act,
the appellate court felt it was "patently incongruous to suggest that the
legislature would have afforded the Act's heightened protection to unmarried
cohabitants." 56 Therefore, the court defined the term "marital status"
narrowly because to do otherwise would conflict with "Illinois' strong public
policy in favor of strengthening and preserving the integrity of mar57
riage."
58
In 1990, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Cooper v. French
that a landlord's right to free exercise of religion, under the Minnesota
59
Constitution, allowed him to refuse to rent to an unmarried couple.
Layle French owned a house in Marshall, Minnesota which he was renting,
while attempting to sell. 60 Because French was a member of the Evangelical Free Church, and his religious beliefs held that an unmarried couple

51. Peter M. Stein, Note, Smith v. FairEmployment and HousingCommission: Does
the Right to Exclude, Combinedwith ReligiousFreedom,Presenta "HybridSituation "Under
Employment Division v. Smith?, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 146 (1995).

52. 553 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. 2d), cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 694 (I11.
1990).
53. Id. at 1160.
54. Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (II1. App. 2d), cert. denied,
561 N.E.2d 694 (I11. 1990) (referring to 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1995)).
55. Id. at 1156-60.
56. Id. at 1158.
57. Id. (quoting Hewit v. Hewit, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (III. 1979)).
58. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
59. Id.at 11.
60. Id.at 3.
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living together outside of marriage was sinful, he did not rent to unmarried
couples. 6 1 In February of 1988, French agreed to rent the house to Susan
Parsons, a single woman at the time; however when French discovered that
Parson's fianc6 would be living with her, he returned her security deposit
and refused to rent to her. 62 An administrative law judge found French
guilty of violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act63 and fined him for
damages. 6 4 In a four-to-three decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed French's conviction and found that the Minnesota Constitution
granted "far more protection of religious freedom than the broad language
of the United States Constitution." 65 Similar to the statutory construction
reasoning used in Mister v. A.R.K., the court found that "construing 'marital
status' to include unmarried cohabiting couples is inconsistent with public
,"66
policy, legislative intent, and previous decisions of this court ...
Therefore, the government would need to demonstrate a "compelling and
overriding state interest" in allowing unmarried couples access to housing
in order to override French's free exercise rights. 67 The court held that
existed and, to the contrary,
no such compelling and overriding state interest
68
the statute would be promoting fornication.
In 1991, the California Court of Appeals for the Second District, in the
case of Donahue v. FairEmployment and Housing Commission, interpreted
"marital status" so as to include two single people cohabiting as a couple.6 9 The state statute involved was the California Fair Employment
Housing Act which prohibited discrimination against prospective tenants on
the basis of their marital status. 70 In Donahue, Agnes and John Donahue,
devout Roman Catholics owned a rental apartment. 7 1 The Donahues
believed that sexual intercourse outside of marriage was a moral sin and that
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
Minn. Stat. § 363.03 (2)(1)(a)(1986).
Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 4.
Id. at 5, 9. The applicable portion of the Minnesota Constitution reads:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience shall never be infringed.., nor shall any control of or interference with the rights
of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment
or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed
as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

of the State. Id. at 9 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16).
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 9.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 10.
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 33 n.I.
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it was wrong for them to aid another person in the commission of a sin. 72
When Verna Terry and Robert Wilder, an unmarried couple, inquired about
the apartment, Mrs. Donahue told them that "I'm really old-fashioned, and
I don't approve of that sort of thing. I don't rent apartments to unmarried
73
couples."
In its opinion, the court first examined whether the prospective tenants
should be included under the protection of the statute, specifically its
"marital status" clause. 74 The court concluded an unmarried couple did
fall under the class the statute was meant to protect, however, the court then
went on to apply a balancing test to the facts of the case. 75 The court's
reason for doing so was that "government action burdening religious
conduct is subject to a balancing test, in which the importance of the state's
interest is weighed against the severity of the burden imposed on religion."76 The court concluded that "the state's statutory interest in protecting unmarried, cohabitating couples from discrimination ranks relatively low
in the hierarchy of the state's governmental interests." 77 Therefore, the
balancing test tipped in favor of the landlords, and no compelling interest
was found to outweigh the landlords' right to freely exercise their religion. 78 Thus, the landlords were determined by the court to be exempt
79
from the California anti-discrimination law.
In summary, there is currently a myriad of issues and laws to consider
when examining a situation where a landlord refuses to rent to a tenant
because of religious convictions. Not much discussion will be given to the
competing, yet equally important, interests of the potential tenants involved,
namely their constitutional right to equal protection of the law 80 and to be
free from discrimination. The reason being that normally the legitimacy of
their right is not called into question. In contrast, when the courts examine
a landlord's right to freely exercise his/her religion, the individual's actions
81
are not always protected by their right to freely exercise religion.
The Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish between religious
belief and religious conduct to resolve conflicts between state laws and the
72. Id.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.at 33.
Id.at 35-38.
Id.at 38, 41-45.
Id.(quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 762 P.2d 46)).
Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

81. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal.
1996).
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right to free exercise, however, over the first half of this century it came to
realize that such a distinction was not easily made. 82 The next analysis
the Court employed was a balancing test where if a substantial burden on
religious exercise was shown, the state was required to demonstrate its law
furthered a compelling interest through the least restrictive means.8 3 If it
could not do so, the government was required to accommodate the
individual by exempting him/her from the law. In 1990, the Supreme Court
once again attempted to change its analysis; however Congress stepped in
and passed the RFRA, thereby preserving the balancing test previously used
by the Court. The ambiguity which now arises might not seem clear at first.
Is not Congress simply telling the judiciary to go back to the analysis it had
employed previously? Yes ... and no. The legislature is saying to return
to the previous balancing test; however, the courts are now employing a
different authority to conduct this analysis. Instead of this test being derived
from case law interpreting the First Amendment, it is now founded upon
federal law. Questions are also raised as to the constitutionality of
Congress's actions in passing the RFRA as well as supremacy issues
between the state and federal government.
In Smith, the Supreme Court of California was asked to rule on exactly
such issues. It would appear the Court is ready to reverse, or at least stop
the trend towards allowing landlords to discriminate against unmarried
couples, however the basis upon which it does, so is less than clear.
II.

SMITH V. FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND
A.

HOUSING COMMISSION8

CASE FACTS AND HISTORY

In the early 1970s, Evelyn and Paul Smith purchased two rental duplexes in Chico, California to help supplement the income Mr. Smith earned
as a mail carrier.8 5 Since Mr. Smith's death in 1986, Mrs. Smith's primary source of income has been the revenue generated from the rental
units. 86 When one of the units became available for rent, it was advertised

82. See id. at 919.
83. See id.
84. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).

85. Record of Trial, Dep't of Fair Employment and Hous. v. Evelyn Smith, Case Nos.
FHL 86-87 E4-0027, FHL 87-88 E5-0058 at 51-52, 70; James J. Kilpatrick, Why Can't a
Landlady Decide on Tenants?, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 6, 1989, at A09.
86. Record of Trial, Dep't of Fair Employment and Hous. v. Evelyn Smith, Case No.
FHL 87-88 E5-0058 at 52. The four units are operated solely for business purposes and Mrs.
Smith does not live in any of the four units. Further, she only visits them occasionally for
maintenance purposes. Smith, 913 P.2d at 912.
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in the local newspapers and made available to the general public. 8 7 When

prospective renters contacted Mrs. Smith to inquire about the duplexes, Mrs.
Smith would inform them that she preferred married couples because of her
religious convictions. 8 As a Christian, 9 Mrs. Smith believes sex outside
of marriage is sinful and further that it is a sin for her to permit people to
engage in such activity by knowingly renting her units to unmarried couples. 90UBy renting her units to people who will have nonmarital sex on her
property, Mrs. Smith believes God's judgment against her will prevent her
from seeing her husband in heaven. 9' Mrs. Smith has no religious objections to renting to people who are single, divorced, widowed, or married.9 2
But, if faced with the choice of renting to an unmarried couple or not
93
renting at all, Mrs. Smith has stated that her units would remain vacant.
In the spring of 1987, Mrs. Smith advertised a vacancy for one of her
units in the local newspaper. 94 Gail Randall and Kenneth Phillips saw the
95
advertisement and drove by the unit to see if it would meet their needs.
Because of the location, the architecture and the well maintained appearance
of the premises, Randall and Phillips became interested in the rental unit and
called Mrs. Smith the next morning. 96 During the course of the conversa97
tion, Mrs. Smith mentioned that she preferred to rent to married couples.

87. Smith, 913 P.2d at 912.
88. Id.
89. Id. Mrs. Smith is a member of Bidwell Presbyterian Church in Chico and, as of
the trial date in 1988, had attended that church for approximately 25 years. Id.
90. Id. Mrs. Smith stated that: "I believe it's a sin to have sex out of marriage, and
if I rent to [Phillip and Randall,] I'm also contributing to their sin and it's a sin for me. I
believe that I have to answer [for] that as long as I know it's a sin and if I am assisting them
in committing the sin, then I'm guilty, also." Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n,
12 Cal. 4th 1143 (Cal. 1996).
91. Smith, 913 P.2d at 912.
92. Id. In fact, Mrs. Smith has rented to people of all those groups. However, she
would refuse to rent to anyone who engaged in sex outside of marriage, regardless of whether
they were single, divorced, widowed or married. Further, Mrs. Smith rents her units to
people without regard for their race, color, national origin, ancestry, or physical handicap.
She does not know the religious background of most of her tenants, because she never asks
them and whatever she does know about it is information they have volunteered. She does
not consider the religion of her tenants a factor in her decision to whom to rent. Mrs. Smith
has rented her units to both men and women and does not discriminate on the basis of sex.
Id.
93. Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 12 Cal. 4th 1143 (Cal. 1996).
94. Smith, 913 P.2d at 912.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 912-13.
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The next day Randall and Phillips met with Mrs. Smith and were
shown the unit, which they liked a great deal. 98 Mrs. Smith stated, once
again, that she would not rent to unmarried couples, and she then asked how
long Randall and Smith had been married. 99 Phillips falsely represented to
Mrs. Smith that he was married to Randall. 1°° They then filled out an
Randall signed her name
informal rental application for Mrs.
10 1 Smith wherein
Gail Phillips on the document.
A short while later, a lease agreement was executed between the parties
and a $150 security deposit was paid to Mrs. Smith. 10 2 Gail Randall signed
the lease agreement as Gail Phillips. 103 Later that same day, Randall called
and asked Mrs. Smith if she doubted that she was married to Kenneth and
asked if Mrs. Smith would like to see a marriage license as proof.l° 4 Mrs.
Smith told Gail that she did not need to see their marriage license. 10 5 Still
later that day, Kenneth Phillips called Mrs. Smith and told her that he was not
married to Gail. 1° Mrs. Smith told him she could not rent the apartment to
then
them because it would go against her religious beliefs. 10 7 Mrs.10Smith
8
deposit.
security
their
of
amount
the
$150,
for
check
a
sent them
Randall and Phillips filed a complaint with the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission. 109 The Commission alleged Mrs. Smith
had violated two state statutes. First, the Commission purported that she
violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (hereinafter
"FEHA") which prohibited landlords from discriminating against people
because of their marital status. 110 Second, the Commission charged Mrs.
Smith with violating the Unruh Civil Rights Act in that she discriminated
against unmarried couples through her business.1 11 Mrs. Smith defended

98. Id. at 913.
99. Smith, 913 P.2d at 913.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Smith, 913 P.2d at 912.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Smith, 913 P.2d at 912.
110. Id. FEHA provides, in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful: (a) For the owner of
any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person because of the... marital
status ... of such person." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(a) (West 1990).
111. Smith, 913 P.2d at 913. The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides that: "[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race,
color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever." CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51 (West 1996).
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the accusations on two grounds. First, the FEHA did not prohibit discrimination against unmarried couples. 112 And, second, that "to require her to
rent to an unmarried couple over her religious objections would violate the
free exercise clauses of the federal and state Constitutions."" 3 Both the
administrative judge and a subsequent decision by the California Fair
Employment and Housing Commission rejected Mrs. Smith's defenses and
found her actions in violation of the FEHA. 114 The Commission ordered
Smith to "cease and desist from discriminating on the basis of marital status;"
to post and provide notice to prospective tenants the provisions of the FEHA,
the outcome of the Commission's decision in Mrs. Smith's case and a
statement that Mrs. Smith practices equal housing opportunity; and to pay
Randall and Phillips a total of $954 in damages.I11
B.

THE APPELLATE COURT'S DECISION

Following a petition by Mrs. Smith for a writ of mandate, the California
Court of Appeals for the Third District overturned her conviction. 116 The
court found that the state of California could not prevent Mrs. Smith from
discriminating against unmarried couples because of the rights afforded her
by the free exercise clauses of the federal and state Constitutions 117 and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.118 The Supreme Court of
California granted review.119
C.

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In a plurality opinion, the justices of the California Supreme Court held
that the state's anti-discrimination housing law did not substantially burden
Mrs. Smith's religious beliefs1 0 and therefore she was not entitled to an
exemption from the state law.
The central issue under review was "whether Congress's statutory
guarantee of religious liberty excuse[d] a California landlord from complying
with state law prohibiting housing discrimination against unmarried
cohabitating heterosexual
couples when compliance
would conflict with the
,
,,121
landlord's sincerely held religious beliefs.
In order to reach that issue,

112. Smith, 913 P.2d at 913.
113. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I § 4.

114. Smith, 913 P.2d at 914.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I § 4.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4.
119. Smith, 913 P.2d at 914.

120. Id. at 940 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Id. at 939.
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actually violated state
the court needed to first determine whether Mrs. 1Smith
22
couple.
unmarried
an
to
rent
to
refusing
by
law
Various amici curie to the case argued that Mrs. Smith's refusal to rent
was not a violation of the FEHA "because it was based on [Mrs.] Smith's
assumptions about their [Randall and Phillips'] sexual conduct rather than
The plurality opinion, written by Justice
their marital status."123
cannot always be separated from status.
conduct
Werdegar, explained that
decision with similar facts, Werdegar
Court
Citing a recent Alaska Supreme
claim that he does not rent or
reasonably
pointed out that a landlord "cannot
their conduct (living together
on
based
show property to cohabitating couples
when [it is] their marital
status
marital
outside of marriage) and not their
124
...
immoral
conduct
their
makes
[that]
status (unmarried)
Of similar interest was whether the law which banned discrimination on
the basis of "marital status" protected unmarried couples who were living
together. 125 The court, after examining the plain meaning of the stat-

in other statutes, 127 and
ute, 126 the legislature's use of "marital status"
128 concluded that it "does
the legislative history of the law in question,
129

protect unmarried cohabitants against housing discrimination."
After addressing these preliminary issues, of which there was little doubt
the court would find as it did, the more difficult questions waited to be
decided. Justice Werdegar briefly analyzed the history of the case law and
the legislative history surrounding the Free Exercise Clause. He eventually
formed a four-part test which consolidated the RFRA, the decisions
interpreting the RFRA, and the decisions interpreting the Free Exercise
130 Werdegar's analysis
Clause prior to Employment Division v. Smith.
stated that in cases which a neutral, generally applicable law is claimed to
burden the free exercise of religion:

122. Smith, 913 P.2d at 914-15.
123. Id. at 915.
124. Id. (quoting Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 n.4
(Alaska 1994)). Similarly, in a recent decision by the high court of Massachusetts it was
pointed out that "[i]f married couple A wanted to cohabit in an apartment owned by the
defendants, they would have no objection. If unmarried couple B wanted to cohabit in an
apartment owned by the defendants, they would have great objection. The controllingand
discriminatingdifference between the two situations is the difference in the marital status of
the two couples." Id. at 915 n.9 (quoting Attorney General v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316, 320,
636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1994)).
125. Smith, 913 P.2d at 914.
126. Id. at 914-15.
127. Id. at 915.
128. Id. at 916.
129. Id. at 918.
130. Id. at 922.
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(1) The burden must fall on a religious belief rather than
on a philosophy or a way of life. (2) The burdened
religious belief must be sincerely held. (3) The plaintiff
must prove the burden is substantial or, in other words,
legally significant. [And,] (4) If all the foregoing are true,
the government must "demonstrate that application of the
burden to the person ... is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and.., is the least restrictive means
13 1
of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
In applying the test, the crucial point of contention was the third point
in the analysis.' 32 The first two points are not called into question in that
Mrs. Smith's "Christian beliefs are religious and that she sincerely holds them
' 133
is not seriously in question."
The major obstacle to be overcome in deciding the third point, or
whether a substantial burden was being imposed on Mrs. Smith, was that
"[i]n enacting RFRA, Congress did not attempt to define a 'substantial
burden."'' 134 What Congress envisioned was for the courts to look to free
exercise case law in deciding whether a substantial burden was present. 135
Werdegar's opinion for the plurality set forth two major arguments to
support the eventual holding that Mrs. Smith's free exercise rights were not
substantially burdened by the California anti-discrimination law and thus that
she was not entitled to an exemption from the law. 13 6 Justice Kennard
strongly dissented from this portion of the decision and felt "the plurality
opinion is unable to discern any governing principle underlying the selected
cases it surveys that address the substantial burden requirement. '137

131. Id. at 922 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) and (b); 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-l(b); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
132. Smith, 913 P.2d at 942 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Kennard's
opinion stated it best: "the threshold question in analyzing a claim under the RFRA is
whether the government has 'substantially burden[ed] a person's exercise of religion."' Id.
133. Id. at 923. This portion of the test is normally quite easy to establish in that

"religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment protection .... Instead, all that is necessary to establish the
required sincerity is 'an honest conviction' that one's religion prohibits the conduct required
by law." Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981)).
134. Smith, 913 P.2d at 924.

135. Id.

136. Id. at 929.
137. Id. at 943.
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The first argument posed by the plurality was based on the degree of
13 8 The plurality argue that if
compulsion involved in Mrs. Smith's case.
Mrs. Smith did not wish to comply with the anti-discrimination laws, because
of religious reasons, she could sell off her rental units and "redeploy... the
139 The plurality cites as authority, cases
capital in other investments."
involving individuals who had to quit or were fired from their jobs because
140 Under those cases, the Suof a conflict with their religious activity.
preme Court has developed a rule:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct pro scribed [sic] by a religious faith, or
where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulupon free exercise
sion may be indirect, the infringement
14 1
is nonetheless substantial.
The court distinguished such a situation from Mrs. Smith's by pointing out
that she can avoid the conflict, "without threatening her livelihood," by reinvesting elsewhere. 142
In response, Justice Kennard argued Mrs. Smith was faced with the
same, if not a greater burden than that of individuals who might lose their
jobs. 143 Both groups have identical economic pressures. In the first
instance, denying someone unemployment benefits because they quit ajob for
religious reasons "creates economic pressure to remain at a job in violation
of one's religious beliefs." 144 Similarly, requiring Mrs. Smith to rent to
unmarried couples creates an economic pressure for Mrs. Smith to rent to a
145 Further,
group of persons which is a violation of her religious beliefs.
Mrs. Smith's burden is potentially greater in that she is subject to more
governmental control than the employee who is denied unemployment
benefits. Whereas the employee only faces losing the opportunity to collect
unemployment benefits, Mrs. Smith has been imposed civil fines and a cease-

138. Id. at 925.

139.
140.
141.
(1987)).
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141
Id.
Id. at 944-45 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 944.
Id. at 944-45.
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and-desist order dictating her future actions. 146 Should Mrs. Smith follow
her religious beliefs and violate the court order, she would be liable for
additional fines and even imprisonment. 147 Kennard also pointed out that
Mrs. Smith's involvement in her rental units was more like personal labor
than a passive investment, further analogizing to the unemployment
cases. 148
The second proposition the plurality used to demonstrate Mrs. Smith's
free exercise was not substantially burdened was based on the fact that her
actions had a "serious impact on the rights and interests of third parties." 149 Her actions were discriminatory against Randall and Phillips. 150 No such comparable factor was present in the unemployment
benefit cases, in that no third party's rights were injured when the state was
required to pay an individual who quit his/her job for religious reasons. 15 1
The exemption Mrs. Smith desires from the FEHA can "be granted only by
completely sacrificing the rights of the prospective tenants not to be
discriminated against ... on account of [their] marital status. 1 52
This is the heart of the constitutional issue because if the court were to
"grant the requested accommodation, Smith would have more
freedom and
greater protection for her own rights and interests, while Phillips and Randall
would have less freedom and less protection." '1 53
In response, Justice Kennard stated that this analysis was wandering off
from the real issue of whether Mrs. Smith's rights had been substantially
burdened. 154 By examining the rights of third parties which may be
effected by Mrs. Smith's actions, "the plurality opinion conflates the
substantial burden inquiry and the compelling interest test., 1 55 The
question when gauging the substantial burden test is not whether Mrs. Smith
would have greater protection and freedom than Phillips and Randall. 156

146. Id. at 945.
147. Id.

148. Id. at 946-47. Mrs. Smith maintains an active role in managing her rental property.
She puts in "substantial time" managing the apartments, advertising vacancies, and
interviewing potential tenants. Id.
149. Smith, 913 P.2d at 925.
150. Id.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 928.
153. Id. With Mrs. Smith's actions constituting clear discrimination, "to say that the
prospective tenants may rent elsewhere is to deny them the full choice of available housing
accommodations enjoyed by others in the rental market." Id.
154. Id. at 947 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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"Rather, the question is simply what effect the requirements of FEHA have
on Smith's exercise of her religious beliefs."'1 57 Going back to the RFRA
itself, Justice Kennard quotes the question as being whether Mrs. Smith is a
'person whose religious exercise has been burdened,' not whether some
other person would be adversely affected if Smith were granted an accommodation." 158 Instead, this factor should have been considered under the
compelling interest test or the fourth step of Justice Werdegar's analysis. 159 However, because the court determined there to be no substantial
burden on Mrs. Smith's free exercise right and did not proceed past the third
how this factor would have played into the fourth step
factor, it is uncertain
160
analysis.
the
of
D.

ANALYSIS

The California Supreme Court seems to be putting its foot down on the
practice of permitting landlords to choose, based upon religious convictions,
to whom they wish to rent. Moreover, the manner in which they are doing
so does not seem to follow precedential case law. It appears the plurality is
creating a vague and ambiguous area of law where one did not formerly
exist.16 As Justice Kennard stated in his dissent:
Congress did not set loose a doctrinal chameleon for courts
to chase through a jurisprudential swamp. Congress
intended the substantial burden requirement to serve as a
simple threshold test; it did not intend that every RFRA
case would be the occasion for an open-ended metaphysi162
cal inquiry into the meaning of substantial burden.
This area of the law is not as vague as the plurality would like us to believe,
and courts should apply the standards outlined by the RFRA, not by the
California Supreme Court.
Likewise, the claim that Mrs. Smith can freely reinvest her money into
another venture misses the point of her constitutional right. Justice Kennard
posed an excellent illustration to show the flaw in the plurality's opinion. In
his hypothetical he asks: suppose Congress passes a law that all obstetricians
must perform abortions when requested by their patients. Under the plurality
opinion, this law would not substantially burden the free exercise rights of a
157. Id.

158. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c)).
159. Id. at 947-48 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Smith, 913 P.2d at 929.

161. Id. at 943. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Id.
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Catholic obstetrician who objects to abortions and therefore the RFRA would
not provide an exception for the doctor.
Because Catholics need not be doctors and doctors need
not be obstetricians, the obstetrician could avoid the
conflict "without violating [the obstetrician's] beliefs or
threatening [the obstetrician's] livelihood" 163 by abandoning obstetrics and switching to another medical specialty . . . . To grant the obstetrician an accommodation
"would necessarily impair the rights and interests of third
parties,"' 164 the obstetrician's patients who have a constitu165
tional right to [an] abortion.
However, it is not likely such a law was intended by Congress to slip through
the protections provided by the RFRA.166
Discrimination is a serious problem in today's society, but in Mrs.
Smith's context, it does not appear to be a problem worthy of the court's
intervention. Until the 1960's, unmarried heterosexuals living together were
not very common. 167 With their ever increasing numbers, the housing and
employment barriers which existed for them in the past have quickly
dissolved. 168 There was no evidence offered to support the contention that
unmarried couples are "actually having difficulty finding housing; without
such evidence, this claim of a compelling interest is utterly frivolous. 169
As a California decision noted twenty years ago, much of the social stigma
of unmarried couples living together has disappeared. 170
All of the people involved in this case have important rights which are
highly regarded by our society. To fairly decide cases where discrimination
and free exercise are at odds is not an easy task, however, br passing the
RFRA Congress tipped the scales in favor of free exercise.
The RFRA
was intended, according to specific parameters, to provide an exception for
those individuals whose actions were based upon their sincere religious
beliefs. Mrs. Smith is a perfect example of one of those people.

163. Id. at 929.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 95 1.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Smith, 913 P.2d at 952.
Id.
Id. at 953.
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
Smith, 913 P.2d at 956.
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Is it possible that in just one generation, sex outside of marriage has

gone from a misdemeanor to a compelling state interest? 172 And, has it
done so at the expense of certain individual's First Amendment right to freely
exercise their religion? 17 3 According to the California Supreme Court, the

answer to both questions is yes.

III. FUTURE

IMPLICATION OF SMITH

The Smith case may be ripe for review and reversal by the United States
Supreme Court. As Justice Thomas, in a dissent from a denial of certiorari
in an Alaska decision with very similar facts stated, "I am quite skeptical that
Alaska's asserted interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of marital
status is 'compelling' enough to satisfy [the] stringent standards [of Sherbert,
Although, because it denied
Wisconsin v. Yoder, and the RFRA]."
certiorari once, it is likely the Supreme Court is simply leaving the problem
up to the individual states for now.
It is likely another issue, which would have a direct impact on this area
of law, will be addressed by the Court first. Although it was not a pivotal
issue in the Smith case, because neither Randall nor Phillips raised it, the
constitutionality of the RFRA must be established. A number of legal
scholars feel Congress exceeded its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it required, under the RFRA, states to defer to the free
exercise of religion over the Supreme Court's holding in Employment
175
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. ' As of
Circuit, along with three
right now, the federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth176
other courts, have upheld RFRA as constitutional.
For practical reasons it is also worthy of noting that should this decision
ever be reversed, there is not likely to be a shortage on available housing for
unmarried couples. The reason being that such actions as Mrs. Smith took
177 The practical
are not normally in an individual's best financial interest.
ramifications of allowing landlords to refuse to rent to unmarried couples
because of religious reasons are not likely going to be abused because it gains

172. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpretingthe Religious Freedom
RestorationAct, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 223 (1994).
173. Id.
174. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 981 (1994) (Thomas,

J., dissenting).
concurring
175. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); See, e.g., Smith, 913 P.2d at 955 (Kennard, J.,

and dissenting); 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The
ConstitutionalSignificanceof an UnconstitutionalStatutes, 56 MONT. L. REv. 39 (1995).
176. Flores v. City of Boerne Tex., 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996); State v. Miller, 538
N.W.2d 573 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Sasnett v. Dep't of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D.
Wis. 1995); Belgard v. State of Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D. Haw. 1995).
concurring and dissenting).
177. Smith, 913 P.2d at 954 (Kennard, J.,
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nothing. Mrs. Smith's "sincerely held religious beliefs are contrary to her
economic self-interest, for by excluding unmarried heterosexual couples she
is artificially reducing the demand, and thus the price she can command, for
her rental housing.""178 This is in contrast to situations where individuals
who refuse to work for religious reasons are then given unemployment
benefits.
Finally, it may be thought that this case will have a significant bearing
on landlords' rights to refuse to rent to homosexual couples because of
religious reasons, however that is only partially true. The analysis of whether
the state has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination by landlords
against homosexual couples will likely involve significantly different
considerations. 179 "[H]omosexual couples have been subject to a quite
different, and continuing, history of discrimination .... 180
CONCLUSION
In Smith v. FairEmployment and Housing Commission, the Supreme
Court of California did not truly follow the Supreme Court's previous
approach to analyzing the First Amendment right to free exercise. If it had,
it is likely that California's FEHA law would have been found to have had
a substantial burden upon Mrs. Smith's freedom to exercise her religious
beliefs. However, unless the case is retried, it will not be known whether the
state's interest was compelling enough to outweigh her interest.
Further, with the constitutionality of the RFRA still uncertain, it is unclear
which approach to free exercise will weather the storm of court decisions and
legislative action. With the acceptance of many progressive and alternative
lifestyles along with rapidly changing social mores, it appears the freedom of
Americas' citizens to exercise their religion may be in for a rough ride unless
a strong analysis is adopted soon.
DAVID S. GOLES

178. Id.

179. Id. at 952 n.7.
180. Id. See also Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 32 (D.C.
App. 1987) (court found that under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, there is a
compelling state interest in eliminating discrimination against homosexuals).

